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Ashes of Co-optation: 
 
From Armed Group Fragmentation to the Rebuilding of Popular 
Insurgency 
Abstract 
This paper argues that attempts to buy insurgency out of violence can achieve temporary 
stability but risk to produce new conflict. While co-optation with economic incentives might 
work in parts of a movement, it can spark ripple effects in others. These unanticipated 
developments result from the interactions of differently situated elite and non-elite actors, 
which can create a momentum of their own in driving collective behaviour. This paper 
develops this argument by analysing the reescalation of armed conflict between the Kachin 
Independence Organisation (KIO) and Myanmar’s armed forces after a 17-year-long ceasefire 
broke down in 2011. After years of mutual enrichment and collaboration between rebel and 
state elites and near organisational collapse, the insurgency’s new-found resolve and capacity 
is particularly puzzling. Based on extensive field research, this article explains why and how 
the state’s attempt to co-opt rebel leaders with economic incentives resulted in group 
fragmentation, loss of leadership legitimacy, increased factional contestation, growing 
resentments among local communities and the movement’s rank and file, and ultimately the 
rebuilding of popular resistance from within. 
Keywords: Non-State Armed Groups, Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, Conflict 
Resolution, Myanmar (Burma), Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) 
Word count: 9,518 (excluding abstract) 
 
Introduction 
The idea to co-opt rebels with economic incentives has become increasingly popular in 
theory
1
 and practice
2
. At a time when insurgency is more often framed as a criminal business 
network than a revolutionary enterprise,
3
 the underlying logic of altering the cost-benefit 
calculus of rebels in favour for peace by overriding political grievances with economic 
opportunities seems appealing.  
To inquire into the application or non-application of this logic, Myanmar makes for an 
interesting case to study. Since the failure of a post-independence settlement between the 
country’s ethnic minorities and its ethnic majority, several dozen armed ethno-nationalist 
insurgencies have been fighting for more autonomy or outright secession from Myanmar’s 
central government.
4
 For more than two decades the country’s army sought to pacify many of 
2 
 
these insurrections by negotiating separate ceasefire agreements with individual armed 
groups. While these armistices did not lead to substantial political dialogue, they allowed 
insurgents to retain their arms and govern pockets of territory.
5
 Moreover, these pacts 
encouraged armed group involvement in what has been referred to as the country’s “ceasefire 
capitalism”6: the collaborative exploitation of the area’s natural riches by army generals, rebel 
leaders, and Chinese businessmen. As the co-optation of rebels by way of economic 
incentives, indeed, produced remarkably stable settlements for many years, some authors have 
referred to Myanmar as a twist to the conventional “resource curse” narrative.7 Instead of 
fuelling violent conflict over lootable resources, the country’s ceasefire politics seemed to 
demonstrate that ‘economic self-interest can also move combatants to cease hostilities'.8  
One of the oldest and strongest ethnic armed groups in Myanmar - the Kachin 
Independence Organisation (KIO) - agreed to a ceasefire in 1994. As Nicolas Farelly points 
out, this pact had been ‘integral to the security of northern Burma’9 for 17 years. In 2011, 
however fighting between Myanmar’s armed forces – the Tatmadaw – and the KIO escalated 
again. Since then the rugged Kachin hills bordering China have once more been embroiled in 
deadly conflict, resulting in heavy losses on both sides and displacing up to 100,000 
civilians.
10
 This was particularly puzzling as the revolutionary ambitions and military 
capacities of the KIO seemed to have withered away over the long ceasefire years, while its 
leaders profited from the spoils of the ceasefire economies. During these days, they also 
established intimate ties with Tatmadaw commanders and were relatively accommodating 
towards the government.
11
 Since war broke out again the Kachin insurgency has, however, 
revealed military strength, organisational discipline, and a large popular support base. Today 
the KIO also opposes a ceasefire along similar lines as before, demanding for a substantial 
political dialogue instead.
12
 Against this puzzling background, this paper asks: Why and how 
has the KIO’s willingness as well as ability to wage war against Myanmar’s government 
increased so dramatically? 
This paper argues that attempts to co-opt rebel leaders into peace with lucrative 
business concessions have backfired. While economic counterinsurgency has worked to curb 
armed conflict for many years, it left underlying grievances unaddressed and planted the seeds 
of new ones among local communities and among the rank and file of the KIO. These new 
resentments were not only directed against the Myanmar government, but primarily against 
the leadership of the KIO itself. This has undermined the legitimacy of KIO leaders and 
ultimately provided a fertile mobilisation ground for an emerging faction of young officers to 
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take over leadership and refute their organisation’s conciliatory stance. To capture these 
processes it is necessary to analyse the interaction between differently situated and motivated 
elite and mass-level actors of insurgency, which produces multifaceted and shifting 
landscapes of power and legitimacy that develop a momentum of their own in influencing 
armed group behaviour. This within-group perspective helps to explain why elite settlements 
that initially appear successful can be highly unstable in the long-run.  
To present these findings, the paper will first review the situation of the KIO ceasefire 
against the background of economic counterinsurgency in Myanmar. It will then discuss the 
assumptions underlying such economistic engagement of armed groups as well as its pitfalls. 
Building on recent scholarship,
13
 the paper proposes to shift the focus towards the internal 
politics of insurgency. It uses these analytical insight and findings from field research to 
explain how economic counterinsurgency affected cohesion, legitimacy and contestation 
within the KIO and ultimately backfired. 
 ‘Monetary Ammunition’ in Kachin State   
Counterinsurgency doctrine has seen a rapid revival, since US troops have found 
themselves entrapped in battling capable insurgencies in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The US 
military learned from Vietnam that defeating insurgency is not a purely military exercise but 
'"a favorable outcome" will be dependent on the success of our non-military efforts'.
14
 When 
distilling his lessons from Iraq, US counterinsurgency mastermind Lt.-Gen. David Petraeus, 
stressed the importance of economic strategies to counter rebellion by stating that: 'Money is 
ammunition. In fact, depending on the situation, money can be more important than real 
ammunition'.
15
  
To many insurgents in Myanmar, his words sound familiar. This was expressed by a 
high-ranking officer of the Karen National Union (KNU) - the country's longest running 
ethnic insurgency - in an interview about the movement’s current ceasefire with Naypyidaw: 
'They carry money. They don't carry guns, they don't carry bullets.'
16
 After meeting with KNU 
leaders, Myanmar's chief peace negotiator U Aung Min reportedly postulated that if 'they 
become rich, no one will want to hold arms. If their regions are developed, no one will hold 
arms. If we do all these for them they will automatically abandon their arms.'
17
 In the context 
of decades-old protracted social conflicts over political autonomy and minority rights this 
argument seems rather simplistic. Nevertheless, Myanmar’s counterinsurgency fared quite 
well with this for many years. Sherman assesses that one aspect that made the country’s 
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ceasefire agreements of the 1990s ‘both attractive and relatively durable is the economic 
benefits that they yielded to key elites on both sides.’18 For Richard Snyder, Myanmar’s 
armistices exemplify how economic incentives can bring adversaries to the negotiation table 
by providing insurgents with a ‘lucrative “exit option”’.19 Long-term observer Martin Smith 
noted that by turning rebel leaders into businessmen, the Tatmadaw indeed ‘was to have far 
more success in seizing the local initiative from armed opposition groups than it had ever had 
in 26 years of fighting’.20  
Myanmar’s changing counterinsurgency strategy was enabled by two concurrent 
developments in the late 1980s. China changed its interests and policies towards it neighbour 
at the end of the Cold War. Instead of supporting the insurgent Communist Party of Burma 
(CPB), Beijing became interested in exploiting Myanmar's auspicious economic prospects to 
develop its own landlocked and impoverished Yunnan province next door. The Tatmadaw 
used this chance to co-opt the remainders of the CPB - fragmented into smaller ethnic armies 
after a mutiny in 1989 - into ceasefires by granting their leaders lucrative business 
concessions.
21
 While the KIO had not been part of the communist umbrella movement, it also 
entered into a ceasefire along similar lines. Many of its leaders profited from various 
businesses - especially from jade mining and timber logging - and gradually established close 
working relationships with their former enemies.
22
 The relative stability that followed sparked 
an unprecedented wave of investment in Myanmar’s north, mostly in its natural resources. 
Indeed, two thirds of the foreign direct investment (FDI) that entered the country between 
1988 and 2012 – officially recorded as $38 billion - accumulated in the country’s border 
provinces, 25 percent in Kachin State alone.
23
 Yet, these official figures only capture the tip 
of the iceberg. Most of the actual money in the area flows through illicit channels. Sales in 
jade - most of which is sourced from Kachin State – were reported at $34 million in 2011. 
Real jade exports for this year were more likely worth in between $6 to $9 billion.
24
  
While for a long time Myanmar’s ceasefire politics seemed to have provided ‘a 
successful – if crude – tool for conflict resolution’,25 the recent escalation of conflict with the 
KIO – the most prominent ceasefire group of the 1990s – does not fit this picture. When 
Myanmar old-hand Bertil Lintner visited KIO territory during the 1980s, he noted that the 
movement was the 'strongest ethnic rebel army in Burma'.
26
 The insurrection was founded on 
5 February 1961 by a broad Kachin coalition - including university students in Yangon, 
intellectuals in Kachin State’s capital Myitkyina, and Kachin veterans of the Second World 
War - in reaction to repressive state policies that discriminated against ethnic minorities. It 
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quickly developed into one of the most powerful and best organised ethno-nationalist 
insurgencies in Myanmar. By the end of the 1980s it controlled large parts of Kachin State 
and northern Shan State. During these decades the KIO was at the forefront of Myanmar’s 
ethnic insurgency for more autonomy from the central state.
27
 In 1994, however, the KIO 
signed a ceasefire with Yangon at a time when other armed groups in Myanmar's north had 
already signed individual armistices.  
The Kachin movement was pressured to conclude this pact in 1994 for different 
reasons. Most importantly, a Tatmadaw offensive isolated its strong southern brigade, which 
fought in neighbouring northern Shan State. Without possibilities to resupply, these units 
formed an independent movement – the Kachin Defence Army (KDA) – and sought for an 
individual ceasefire with the government in 1991.
28
 According to the current general secretary 
of the KIO, a major incentive behind their agreement lay in the provisions that allowed a war 
weary-movement to retain their arms and to administer a sizeable part of Kachin State.
:
 The 
so-called Kachin State Special Region-2.
29
 This ceasefire territory spanned approximately one 
fifth of Kachin State, mainly along the Chinese border around the rebel-held towns of Laiza 
and Maijayang and in the lesser populated parts of northern Kachin State. Most other areas - 
including the state capital of Myitkyina – remained under government control.30 Outside 
observers also highlighted the importance of economic incentives that made the armistice 
additionally palatable to individual rebel leaders.
31
 The government indeed granted the KIO 
the right to exploit their area's vast natural resources – particularly timber and jade - by setting 
up their own legal corporations, selling concessions to incoming companies, and taxing the 
ever growing transborder trade with China.
32
 Subsequently it became one of the most 
accommodating ceasefire groups, whose leaders then seemed more interested in plundering 
their territories together with Tatmadaw generals and Chinese businessmen than in waging 
revolutionary war.
33
 According to a foreign diplomat in Yangon at the time, the KIO was 
formerly regarded as one of the “good” ethnic armed groups that had not colluded with the 
Tatmadaw. With its increasing business activities after the ceasefire, the KIO has increasingly 
been identified with the “bad” armed groups mostly associated with running illicit businesses 
along the Myanmar-China border.
34
  
Since the sudden breakdown of the 17 years-long ceasefire in June 2011, however, the 
KIO has defied this role as rebels-turned-businessmen. Instead the movement has since again 
been willing to fight again, spearheading a camp of ethnic armed groups that are least willing 
to compromise with Naypyidaw on the negotiation table.
35
 These shifting realities first 
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surfaced in 2008 at a time of heightened tension. In an attempt to exert tighter control over 
ceasefire groups, Naypyidaw demanded that the various armed groups transform themselves 
into so-called Border Guard Forces (BGFs). This project aimed at legalising armed groups as 
militias in return for their subordination under Tatmadaw command. Moreover, it was meant 
to minimise their political ambitions by offering the registration of political ethnic minority 
parties instead, which were promised to compete in future election campaigns.
36
 After long 
years of ceasefires and militarised state-building - which has significantly reduced the 
strength of most ethnic armies - Myanmar’s generals seemed to have finally concluded that 
they had tipped the balance of forces in their favour and were determined to bring the 
country’s borderlands under more direct control.37 Many of the old KIO elite – who have 
ensured the movement’s conciliatory stance for many years – were inclined to give in to this 
demand. Some of them had previously taken part in other government initiatives, including 
the National Convention process in 2003, which was tasked with drafting the country’s 2008 
constitution.
38
 In their opinion, submitting their armed wing to government control and 
establishing a political party was better than risking a return to armed conflict.
39
  
Yet, the BGF issue brought an internal struggle for leadership to the fore. A faction of 
young officers vehemently opposed the Tatmadaw's demand, viewing it as the potential 
‘deathblow to the KIO.’40 This grouping eventually managed to take over leadership within 
the KIO and subsequently refused to transform it into a government militia. Since then the 
once close working relations between the KIO and Naypyidaw have deteriorated rapidly and 
the new Kachin leadership has refuted its conciliatory policies. Having formerly consented to 
the 2008 constitution, the KIO now fiercely opposes it, demanding instead for federal reforms 
and political autonomy for ethnic minority groups. The new KIO leadership has also started to 
raise concerns about the detrimental effects of joint Myanmar-Chinese infrastructure projects 
in the region, an issue its former leaders had silently condoned. In an open letter to China's 
then President Hu Jintao, the new KIO leadership called for an end to the construction of the 
Myitsone mega-dam in Kachin State, warning that the project’s impacts on local communities 
could spark full-blown civil war.
41
 Only weeks afterwards, in June 2011, Tatmadaw troops 
attacked Kachin positions at another, already operating, Chinese hydropower plant in Tarpein 
in an attempt to clear the site of rebel units, which triggered the new war in Myanmar’s 
north.
42
 While the co-optation of KIO leaders with economic incentives stabilised the area for 
17 long years, it did not create lasting peace.  
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The Pitfalls of Economic Counterinsurgency  
The idea of buying insurgents out of violence - as put forward by some scholars of 
conflict resolution
43
 - dovetails with an understanding of civil wars that views economic 
profiteering rather than ideology or political grievances as the main driving force behind 
contemporary armed conflicts.
44
 To be sure, economic factors have also featured in older 
literature that highlighted socio-economic marginalization as a cause of civil wars.
45
 Yet, to 
Edward Azar this is only part of the equation as the ‘real sources of conflict – as distinct from 
features – are deep-rooted in the lives and ontological beings of those concerned.’46 For him, 
key to understanding why men take up arms against their government is identity and 
particularly the ‘denial of separate identity of parties involved in the political process.’47  
By contrast, post-Cold War scholars have increasingly viewed rebel groups as war 
entrepreneurs and depicted their political agendas as little more than smoke-screens for 
opportunistic rent-seeking.
48
 Since then Paul Collier’s famous proposition that present-day 
insurgency is motivated by economic “greed” rather than political grievances,49 has been 
criticized on theoretical, methodological, and normative grounds.
50
 While this article cannot 
dwell at length upon this debate, it is important to note that more recent quantitative research 
has refuted Collier’s founding argument, showing that grievances – if measured differently - 
are indeed a major driver of civil wars.
51
 Nevertheless, economistic understandings of conflict 
have become deeply engrained in conflict studies, while identity explanations have taken a 
backseat. As Siniša Malešević points out, contemporary conflict analyses rarely features 
identity as an ‘original generator of social action, but always a second order reality, a reactive 
force to some other supposedly primary cause’.52 
The focus on political economy has also impacted on the scholarship and practice of 
conflict resolution. The development of the so-called spoiler concept is particularly telling. 
Originally proposed by Stephen Stedman, spoilers attempt to sabotage peace negotiations for 
their own self-interest.
53
 With the increasing popularity of economistic explanations for 
violence, spoilers have also become understood as having vested interests in maintaining their 
assets in war economies.
54
 Scholars have since asked how peace can come about if conflict is 
so profitable. One seemingly obvious answer is to buy “greedy” spoilers off with economic 
incentives.
55
 Comparative studies show that negotiated settlements in civil wars indeed often 
involve the selective economic co-optation of different warring factions.
56
 According to Le 
Billon, members of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia have even lost interest in their insurgency 
altogether after being granted lucrative teak concessions.
57
 Yet, in other cases, similar 
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approaches turned out to be more problematic. In an attempt to appease the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) in Serra Leone – which was viewed as being largely motivated by 
profiting from so-called “blood diamonds” – the Lomé Peace Accord offered rebel leaders 
government position that conceded to them official control of the country’s mineral resources. 
Yet, the accord broke down soon after, mainly as it failed to appreciate diverse motivations or 
institutionalise other mechanisms of power-sharing.
58
  
While it can be doubted that counterinsurgency in Myanmar is informed by Western 
theories of armed conflict, political economy scholars have referred to the business elements 
of the country’s ceasefires as examples that show how economic interests can be harnessed 
for conflict resolution.
59
 Yet, Sherman also warned about the pitfalls of ‘a rough and ready 
peace through economic incentives’60 in his assessment of the situation in the early 2000s: 
‘[A]greements reached on the basis of economic interests do not lead to 
sustainable peace because they fail to address the root causes of conflict. As 
Burma also shows, such cease-fire deals encourage corruption and 
criminality, exacerbating existing grievances while also creating secondary 
rivalries, both of which may contribute to new cycles of violence.’61 
Recent developments within the KIO were to prove him right indeed. This paper will 
show how the selective co-optation of the movement’s leadership sparked fragmentation and 
infighting, led to a serious loss of legitimacy among local communities as well as the 
movement’s own rank and file, and finally gave rise to a new faction of young officers who 
refuted the accommodating stance of their superiors. As Sherman notes together with Karen 
Ballentine, understanding such non-linear dynamics necessitates capturing ‘the ways that 
economic opportunities and incentives may interact with a range of other motivations to shape 
the behavior of differently situated rebel actors and their commitment to the insurgency’62. 
These micro-dynamics have largely been overlooked by earlier theories of conflict resolution 
that frame armed groups as rather unitary actors.
63
 This paper, therefore, shifts the level of 
analysis towards a within group perspective.  
From Rebels to Businessmen and Back 
Charles Tilly long ago argued that 'coherent, durable, self-propelling social units - 
monads - occupy a great deal of political theory but none of political reality'
64
. Scholarship on 
armed groups is no exception. On the contrary, Stathis Kalyvas has pointed out that political 
scientists 'often conceptualize non-state political factions involved in civil wars as monolithic 
actors'
65
. By doing so scholars of conflict resolution have commonly assumed that rebel 
9 
 
movements act according to a unified strategic rationale aimed at maximising their perceived 
utility vis-à-vis the state.
66
 Yet, Kalyvas shows that civil wars are not ‘binary conflicts'67 
organised around a 'master cleavage’.68 Their logic is also driven by private interests and local 
power struggles. These ambiguities are obscured by the conventional birds-eye view.  
A young body of literature has started to explore power dynamics within insurgency 
by conceptualising rebel groups as heterogeneous movements.
69
 According to this 
understanding, differently situated actors form malleable alliances, fragment into factions 
along various fault lines, and wield different sources of authority corresponding to their 
location within a fluid network of power. These internal cleavages entail contestation for 
leadership between rival factions which, in turn, develop a momentum of its own in driving 
armed group behaviour. Wendy Pearlman's work shows that this can lead to negotiation or 
spoiling strategies that - while suboptimal from an external utility perspective - can be rational 
for forwarding internal power interests.
70
 Cunningham et al. agree that individual rebel 
factions struggle for leadership against each other. Yet, they stress that this happens 
simultaneously to their contest with the state. While insurgents engage in the first competition 
of this 'dual contest' for increasing their own faction's political power and material gains, they 
contend in the latter for gaining benefits for the movement as a whole. Their findings support 
the argument that although the conflict behaviour of individual rebel factions might often 
seem to be at odds with their preferences in the wider struggle with the state, it can be 
perfectly consistent with their internal struggle for power.
71
  
In both contests legitimacy – or ‘the acceptance […] of an existing social order’72 - 
among local communities and a movement’s rank and file is key for rebel leaders. This is 
because popular insurgency relies on local communities for intelligence, recruits, food, taxes, 
and shelter for challenging a militarily superior state army.
73
 Its relationship to the grassroots 
cannot, however, solely be based on coercion as power without legitimacy is unstable and 
ultimately impotent. This observation – a pillar of theories on legitimate authority, from 
Machiavelli to Weber
74
 - featured prominently among classic practitioners and theorists of 
guerrilla warfare. Mao Zedong, Che Guevara, and Ho Chi Min attributed their successful 
campaigns first and foremost to political mass mobilisation that included the establishment of 
alternative civil administration aimed at integrating local communities into the structure of 
insurgency.
 75
 A helpful way to conceptualise this authority relationship between rebels and 
communities is the notion of an informal social contract. First proposed by Timothy 
Wickham-Crowley and further explicated by Zacharia Mampilli, this pact incorporates 
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contractual obligations from both sides. Ideally, rebels provide basic security, order, and 
welfare, while communities obey and participate in insurgency. If rebels do, however, not 
fulfil their part of this deal – for instance, by not protecting civilians – legitimacy and, hence, 
power can wither away as well.
76
 The case of the KIO helps to illustrate these processes. 
Group Fragmentation  
While rebel groups are inherently heterogeneous movements, various military, 
political and economic factors can further impact on group cohesion and potentially lead to 
infighting.
77
 Economic counterinsurgency in Kachin State had exactly these effects. In an 
interview a current KIO leader admits that during the ceasefire 'the government gave a lot of 
business opportunities to the armed groups and some leaders made a lot of benefits from that, 
not only within the KIO but also in other groups.'
78
 Yet, he explains that the KIO leaders at 
the time initially hoped to utilise the arising economic opportunities to develop the 
marginalised region to the benefit of the Kachin people.
79
 While investment in infrastructure 
was welcomed by Myanmar’s military government, it soon transpired that the country’s 
generals were not willing to seek a broader political solution to end the country’s civil war, 
arguing that they could not decide on political matters due to their own status as interim 
administrators. The KIO could, hence, not attain wider constitutional change. But it was 
authorized to administer and develop a small patch of designated territory along the Chinese 
border.
80
  
With the ceasefire in place, the guerrillas’ administrative arm proliferated. The KIO 
established functional departments, including the departments of health, education, 
agriculture, and women’s affairs.81 In cooperation with the local churches, particularly with 
the well-connected Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC), the KIO built schools, hospitals and 
academies to train teachers and nurses. Between 1998 and 2006 about 350 teachers graduated 
from the KIO Teacher Training School in Mai Ja Yang. Many went on to teach in the 
approximately 150 schools that the KIO administered by 2005 all over Kachin State.
82
 
According to KIO general secretary Brig.-Gen. Dr. La Ja, another major focus rested on the 
development of physical infrastructure, often in cooperation with incoming mining 
companies. Looking back at the 1990s, he assesses:  
'Our most significant achievement during these years was infrastructure 
development. […] So we developed many roads, for cars […]. These were 
very good roads, perfect roads. But now they are destroyed by the war.'
83
  
11 
 
The KIO also sought to improve the dire electricity supply in Kachin State. To do so 
the KIO set up their own development corporation, the BUGA Corporation, which hired the 
Chinese company Jinxin to developed two hydropower plants at the Mali and the Dabak 
rivers in return for extensive logging rights in the area.
84
 Since 2006 these dams have 
provided electricity to Myitkyina - the government-controlled provincial capital of Kachin 
State - and neighbouring Waimaw Township.
85
 
Infrastructure for resource deals and taxing the rapidly expanding ceasefire economy 
was instrumental in funding the KIO and its developmental ambitions after the ceasefire.
86
 
The KIO has, however, long engaged in various economic activities on the Myanmar-Chinese 
border for funding its insurgency. Historically most revenues stemmed from petty jade mining 
and small commodity smuggling.
87
 Yet, the end of fighting in 1994 stabilised the area to an 
extent that enabled Chinese, Myanmar and Kachin companies to exploit natural resources on 
an unprecedented scale and pace.
88
 While the Myanmar government has gradually taken 
control of the most profitable mining chunks in the region since the early 1990s - including 
the infamous jade mines of Hpakant - the KIO has become more reliant on timber logging.
89
 
This became additionally attractive by rising prices paid by Chinese consumers due to a 
newly imposed logging ban in China.
90
 After the ceasefire in 1994 Chinese companies also 
started large-scale hydraulic gold mining – mostly along the river banks along the Irrawaddy 
River and its two tributaries Mali and N’mai. Taxing gold mine operators has since provided 
the KIO with additional income.
91
  
Participating in these lucrative industries, however, did not only enable the expansion 
of services and the construction of infrastructure but also led to corruption and profiteering 
among the higher echelons of the KIO. An elder of the important KBC 
 in Myitkyina - who is well-connected inside the KIO - describes how these new 
opportunities forged alliances between former foes by turning rebel leaders into businessmen: 
'The KIO has many departments and the department heads know the Chinese 
businessmen well. Until 2008/9 many KIO leaders became big businessmen, 
including the heads of the mining and forest department. They became rich. 
[...] They have many nice houses in the cities and a lot of land. They worked 
very close with the Myanmar leaders’ to the extent that they were not 
‘faithful to the KIO’'92 
At the same time as many Kachin leaders developed intimate ties with their erstwhile 
enemies, competing business interests sparked rivalry among them. Individual strongmen 
often lined the pockets of their own families first. This led to the fragmentation of the 
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movement’s leadership, turning KIO strongmen against each other.93 In the early 2000s, these 
tensions peaked violently. In 2001, Lt.-Gen. N’ban La ousted the organisation's top-leader 
since the ceasefire - Gen. Zau Mai - in a coup. According to the KBC elder this happened 
because: 
'Inside the KIO they had many individual conflicts, you know.. Zau Mai, 
he took too much opportunities, advantage to do business, working with 
the Chinese, and also with his own relatives, very close relatives. This is 
why the power struggle happened in the KIO. [..] Many people viewed 
him as too much selfish, giving our jade mining concessions to his 
relatives. That's why N'ban La took over the power from him.’94 
When asked about the subsequent assassination of the rebel army's vice-chief of staff 
and head of intelligence in 2004 that followed another attempted coup, he adds that 'all the 
conflicts within the KIO back then were based on business, based on personal business 
interests.’95 The next section will show how corruption and infighting discredited KIO leaders 
among local communities. Together with a highly uneven distribution of burdens and benefits 
from extractive industries, this gave rise to new grievances in the area. This time, however, 
the resentments were not directed against Myanmar’s generals but against the KIO leadership 
itself, which eroded the movement’s legitimacy.  
Eroding Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is key for leaders of popular insurgency in their quest for support from 
local communities and from their own rank and file. Fulfilling their side of the informal social 
contract between rebels and inhabitants of rebel territory is, hence, crucial for rebel leaders to 
maintain authority and ultimately power.
96
  
The new prospects for increased security and welfare initially had the potential to 
benefit the standing of KIO leaders after the ceasefire. In 1994 many Kachin civilians indeed 
felt optimistic that their insecure and impoverished circumstances would improve after 
decades of brutal civil war.
97
 To be sure, the end of fighting removed the most significant 
sources of insecurity. The developmental agenda of the KIO has also contributed to increase 
access to education, health, and electricity in their administered areas.
98
 Moreover, incoming 
investments and better transport links have made many towns of Kachin state modestly 
prosperous.
99
 Despite these tangible benefits, many ordinary Kachin today feel as if their 
socio-economic lot as well as their security situations has not significantly improved since 
1994. This is mostly due to the large-scale unsustainable resource exploitation, cut loose after 
the ceasefire, whose environmental impacts – including deforestation and water pollution –
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squeezed the livelihoods of many local subsistence farmers.
100
 In addition to the 
environmental costs, the ceasefire economies brought about new social problems. With the 
1990s ceasefire the narcotics industry in northern Myanmar has become de-facto tolerated.
101
 
Although the KIO itself officially stopped growing poppy in 1991, drugs in Kachin State have 
since become cheaper and more readily available.
102
 Droves of migrant workers flocking to 
the region’s extractive industries and a subsequent rise in prostitution in combination with 
spiralling heroin consumption led to an HIV/Aids epidemic in Kachin State.
103
 This has had a 
particular sever impact on the Kachin youth.
104
 A local priest in Laiza explains that these 
detrimental impacts of the ceasefire economies have eroded the legitimacy of the KIO among 
local communities. According to him, continued impoverishment of local communities at a 
time when KIO leaders grew rich led to a situation where many former supporters ‘didn't 
accept the KIO as their representative anymore.’105  
Besides socio-economic problems, the militarised character of the ceasefire economies 
perpetuated everyday insecurities for the ordinary Kachin despite the cessation of fighting. In 
a camp for internally displaced persons a father of five tells that his family had to flee four 
times from the Tatmadaw during the last twenty years, which two of his sons did not survive: 
'Now we ended up here because of the war. But before that we had to leave because the 
companies and Burmese soldiers took our land for doing business.'
106
 Some of these business-
related land grabs and displacements are well documented by local rights activists.
107
 The 
Tatmadaw, moreover, used the ceasefires of the 1990s to build up military capacities in 
northern Myanmar, particularly in areas of economic interests. For local communities, this 
was often accompanied by abuses at the hands of the military - including extortion, forced 
labour, and expropriation.
108
 Due to the ceasefire obligation the KIO did not protect Kachin 
civilians from these new sources of insecurity. Sitting on his desk in the KIO’s transitional 
headquarters –situated in one of Laiza’s abandoned Chinese casinos and fondly called ‘the 
Pentagon’ by locals – the current joint general secretary of the KIO ponders about these past 
predicaments: 
 'This became a dilemma and weakened the KIO. Within the ceasefire it was 
very difficult for the KIO to manoeuvre between the government and the 
civilians. They were trying to get trust from the civilian side but also not to 
break down the ceasefire with the government. [..] From the civilians view, 
the KIO sometimes even looked like a government agency.'
109
  
During an informal talk a senior officer of the movement's armed wing - the Kachin 
Independence Army (KIA) - admits that among the biggest problems arising of this situation, 
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indeed, was that 'we could not provide security for the public. We simply had no power to 
protect them.'
110
 According to the local priest in Laiza, this lack of protection coupled with the 
KIO’s own complicacy in these destructive industries was the major reasons why ‘people 
became very disillusioned about the KIO and thought it lost its revolutionary goals.’111  
Rebuilding Popular Insurgency 
Armed groups can be comprised of different factions, which compete over leadership 
within their movement. These internal struggles develop their own dynamic in driving armed 
groups behaviour.
112
 The next section will explain how – in addition to the eroding legitimacy 
of the KIO among local communities - the co-optation of KIO leaders also steered 
resentments among their rank and file. This brought about a new faction of young officers 
who opposed the old leaders’ business-focused and conciliatory stance, built a new popular 
support base from within, and ultimately took over leadership.  
While civilian departments in the KIO expanded during the ceasefire years and 
individual leaders profited, the loser of this transformation was the organisation’s armed 
wing: the KIA. At the same time its senior commanders capitalised upon the ceasefire 
economy, defections and low morale withered the KIA’s base away. Witnessing their 
superiors’ self-enrichment, infighting, and amicable ties with the Tatmadaw as well as 
experiencing their own inability to protect Kachin civilians, the morale within the middle and 
lower ranks of the KIA plunged. A Kachin soldier remembers these days as ‘really dark. We 
just didn’t know what to fight for anymore’.113 These developments gave rise to a new faction 
within the KIA, which was comprised of young aspiring officers led by Brigadier Gun Maw, 
who as General Major currently serves as the KIA’s vice-chief of staff. Ranked at the middle 
of a top-down military organisation in a strictly age-based traditional society, these young 
officers were alienated by the rampant corruption of their superior, from whose sources of 
power and wealth they were excluded. Faced with the potential collapse of their army, a 
disintegrating central leadership, and the erosion of the movement's overall political 
legitimacy among local communities, they sought to change this unpromising status quo. 
Asked about these days, one of the co-founders of this internal opposition explicates:  
'There was a gap between old officers and young officers, their ideas and 
many other things [...]. For example, the old men acted just like Burmese 
soldiers, they wanted to control everything. They wanted to control the 
organisation and make profit. But the young officers wanted to change that 
behaviour.'
114
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The widespread grievances among their foot soldiers and ordinary Kachin - which 
were directed against the KIO’s top-leadership - provided the young officers with a fertile 
mobilisation ground for changing the movement from within. To re-establish local support for 
the Kachin insurgency, they built strategic alliances with the two major churches of the 
region, the Kachin Baptists Convention and the local Roman Catholic Church. Since the 
arrival of Christian missionaries in the late 19
th
 century, Christianity – particularly the large 
Baptist Church – has had a significant influence on the construction of modern Kachin 
identity.
115
 Although the KIO was never a religiously inspired movements, the interests of the 
KIO and the Kachin churches have historically overlapped to significant degrees. This is not 
least because most Kachin ethno-nationalist leaders were educated in church institutions, such 
as the Kachin Theological College in Myitkyina.
116
 A local priest, however, describes that 
during the ceasefire KIO leaders have become 'increasingly secretive, they didn't let the 
younger leaders or the public know about their plans, and did not listen to us either.'
117
 By 
contrast, the young officers turned out to be eager listeners and partnered with the churches as 
they set out to regain legitimacy among local communities. A close companion of this new 
faction describes how difficult it was to  
'relate to the people again. I mean the people of Myitkyina [government-
controlled capital of Kachin State]. Before that [changes in the KIO], the 
people of Myitkyina were afraid of the KIA. Even though they are Kachin, 
they were afraid of the KIA. [...] Afraid because before that most of the KIA 
leaders were like businessmen.'
118
 
The bond with the influential Kachin churches proved to be instrumental for the young 
officers to rebuild the organisation’s legitimacy, as priests are respected moral authorities in 
Kachin society. Besides building this local support network, the aspiring rebel faction sought 
to gradually take over leadership by recruiting new members to the insurgency on a large 
scale. The most instrumental tool for this was the establishment of the KIO youth wing - the 
Education and Economic Development for Youth (EEDY). Since the mid-2000s the EEDY 
has recruited hundreds of students in universities and high schools across Kachin State for 45-
day-long workshops, where they learn about the political demands of the KIO as well as 
receiving basic training in guerrilla warfare. Potential recruits are targeted, for instance, with 
revolutionary karaoke videos, whose depicted realities stand in stark contrast to the depressed 
environment of urban youth in these areas. Rather than picturing rampant drug abuse and 
widespread disillusionment about the dire state of the local economy and lack of employment, 
they visualise revolutionary agendas promising an end to injustice, improved security, and 
generally a better life.
119
 In addition, the new faction established an officer school in 2007 that 
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has since trained a new generation of revolutionary cadres. Most of them have a background 
with the EEDY, are loyal to the young officers, and are placed in key positions within the 
KIA after graduation. The skilful crafting of new institutions has revived the Kachin 
insurgency, whose ranks have swollen to approximately 10,000 fighters again. In combination 
with the re-established alliance to local churches, this has shifted the power relations within 
the KIO towards the young officers more generally. By the time Naypyidaw demanded the 
movement to transform into a BGF government militia in 2008, the young KIO officers have 
managed to become a formidable and coherent force within the KIO. Opposing Naypyidaw’s 
demand as the potential deathblow to their movement and their conciliatory old guard as 
appeasers, they eventually took over leadership and mobilised the KIA brigades against the 
looming confrontation with the Tatmadaw. A long-term companion of Gen.-Maj. Gun Maw 
and co-founder of the movement’s youth wing explains the importance of these internal 
changes for understanding the group at large:  
'Now most of the young officers are educated men. They came from 
universities to the EEDY and then to the new officers school. With that they 
could change the old people, the old officers [...] after that everything changed 
in the KIO.'
120
 
Conclusion 
Insurgency consists of differently situated and motivated elite and non-elite actors. It 
does not emerge out of the blue and cannot operate in insolation from local communities. In 
fact, legitimacy and support is crucial for waging successful guerrilla warfare. The central 
argument behind this conceptualisation of insurgency is that armed groups behaviour is not 
the result of strategic rationalising by a unified leadership but the result of complex social 
interactions. This explains why tweaking the external economic incentive structure of 
rebellion might serve to selectively co-opt rebel leaders into cooperation. At the same time, 
however, this can also fragment movements and erode legitimacy, which might well spark 
new sites of internal contestation and reinforce armed group resistance over time. This paper 
has demonstrated these processes with the case of the KIO, arguing that the 17-year long 
ceasefire was only a façade of stability, which contained within itself the seeds of its own 
destruction. Albeit years of collaboration with Myanmar’s establishment and near 
organisational collapse, the KIO emerged strengthened and less accommodating. These 
insights are highly relevant for practitioners of conflict resolution in Myanmar and beyond. 
The main lesson is that economic incentives cannot simply override political grievances. On 
the contrary, if the oft-legitimate political demands and grievances of rebel movements as 
17 
 
well as their internal fabrics of power and legitimacy are not appreciated, an economistic 
engagement of armed groups is likely to cause new violence.  
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